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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-1354
PAULINE R. GOINS,
                                                     Appellant
       v.
ECHOSTAR COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION
_______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 02-cv-00648)
District Judge:  Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
August 30, 2005
BEFORE:  SLOVITER, BARRY and FISHER, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: August 31, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Pauline Goins appeals pro se the District Court’s grant of EchoStar
Communication’s motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging sex and race
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Title VII), and 43 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. §§ 951-63 (PHRA).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review1
over the grant of a motion for summary judgment and apply the same test as the District
Court.  See Wastak v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, 342 F.3d 281, 285 (3d Cir. 2003).
2
The parties are familiar with the facts, thus, we will only briefly summarize them
here.  Goins was hired as a customer service representative on January 8, 2001.  She was
placed in a training class with Jeff Hack (white), Susan Roach (white), and several other
black and white new hires of both genders.  The class was led by Stephanie Blissman. 
During a training class on January 18, 2001, an incident occurred between Roach and
Goins which ended with the two women cursing at each other.
Management was notified of the incident and suspended both Roach and Goins,
but Roach chose to quit.  Management conducted an investigation and terminated Goins
for the use of profanity and abusive behavior.  Goins then retained counsel and brought
the current action.  She alleges that Blissman mischaracterized her conduct during the
dispute with Roach because of race and/or gender bias.  Goins also claims that Blissman
and management were aware of another disruptive white male trainee, Jeff Hack, who
was chastised informally, but never reported to management.  EchoStar moved for
summary judgment, which was granted.  Goins then filed this appeal.1
Initially, Goins petitions for leave to supplement the record.  We have continuously
held that this Court “cannot consider material on appeal that is outside of the district court
record.”  In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.’s Application for Access to Sealed Transcripts,
913 F.2d 89, 96 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).  However, in exceptional cases we
3may open the record either under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e) or under any
“inherent equitable power.”  Id. (stating without deciding that our equitable powers may
permit us to grant leave to supplement the record).
Rule 10(e) permits correction or modification of the record “[i]f anything material
to either party is omitted from . . . the record by error or accident . . . .”  We see no reason
to employ Rule 10(e) or any equitable power we may have to include extra-record items
where the documents were previously available and merely support what is already in the
record.  Appellee moved to strike these additional exhibits as well as several portions of
Goins’ informal brief where she argues theories inconsistent with those presented to the
District Court.  We deny the Appellee’s motion to strike, but consistent with the above
position, we will not consider exhibits or arguments not presented to the District Court. 
See United States v. Donsky, 825 U.S. 746, 749 (3d Cir. 1987).  The motion to
supplement the record is denied.
To prevail under Title VII or its analogous provision in the PHRA, see Jones v.
Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1999), Goins must satisfy the three-
step burden shifting inquiry under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-04 (1973).  First, she must establish a prima facie case.  If she succeeds, “the burden
shifts to the employer to advance a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its adverse
employment action.”  Id. at 802-03.  If the employer advances such a position, the burden
shifts back to the employee to prove that the non-discriminatory explanation is merely a
4pretext for discrimination.  Id. at 804.  The establishment of a prima facie case produces a
presumption of discrimination, which means “a finding of predicate fact . . . produces a
required conclusion in the absence of explanation.”  St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (internal quotation omitted); Jones, 198 F.3d at 410-11.  In the
instant type of employment action, establishing this presumption requires a showing that a
similarly situated employee received more favorable treatment.  See, e.g., Lanear v.
Safeway Grocery, 843 F.2d 298, 301 (8th Cir. 1988); Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d
577, 586 (6th Cir. 1992).  We agree with the District Court that Goins fails to make this
showing.
Goins argues that trainees Roach and Hack were similarly situated but received
different treatment.  The District Court concluded that Roach was not similarly situated
because she quit before management conducted an investigation and reached any
termination decision.  The record supports this conclusion.  The District Court also found
that Hack was not similarly situated because the relevant decision maker, Mike Duplessis,
did not know about Hack’s statements or disruptive behavior.  Although there is some
controversy over whether anyone in management knew of Hack’s conduct, the record is
void of any indication that Duplessis personally knew of Hack’s misconduct.  Even if a
different manager knew about Hack’s behavior and chose to do little, or nothing at all, the
operative employment decision made by a different independent manager asserting her
discretion is sufficient to differentiate two otherwise similarly situated employees.  See
5Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp, 219 F.3d 612, 617-18 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing several other
circuits supporting this view).
Goins, however, makes a creative argument that Stephanie Blissman, not Mike
Duplessis, was the relevant decision maker because she was the gatekeeper of any
information that was or was not conveyed to management.  Even if we assume that
“evidence of a subordinate’s bias is relevant where the relevant decision maker is not
insulated from the subordinate’s influence,”  Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d
1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27
F.3d 1316, 1323 (8th Cir. 1994) (“an employer cannot escape responsibility for
discrimination when the facts on which the reviewers rely have been filtered by a
manager determined to purge the labor force of [women].”), the record does not support
the inference that Blissman reported either Goins or Roach to management.  Instead,
Goins admits that Heather Langsdorf, another trainee, informed operations manager
Royna Abdulnour that the incident between the two women occurred.  Only then was
management formally involved.  While Blissman’s account of the incident is different
than Goins’ and the other trainees’, the record reveals that management interviewed
Goins and Roach, and despite the differences regarding tones of voice, levels of
responsibility, and who may have been the provocateur, the basic facts of the words used
and arguments presented remain consistent throughout the various recitations.
6Additionally, that Blissman did not report Hack to management for profanity or
disruptive behavior does not mean that she treated Goins differently.  To the contrary, the
record reveals that Blissman initially attempted to handle the Goins/Roach conflict
informally, as she handled Hack’s disruptions, but without success because a manager
took notice of the argument through other channels.  Blissman discussed her perception of
the Goins/Roach incident with management because she was specifically asked to do so,
not because she chose to treat Goins and Hack differently.  The record does not give rise
to an inference of discrimination by either Duplessis or Blissman.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment.  Appellant’s motion to supplement the record is denied.  Appellee’s motion to
strike is denied.
